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Abstract
We consider the manipulability of tournament rules, in which n teams play a round
robin tournament and a winner is (possibly randomly) selected based on the outcome
of all
(
n
2
)
matches. Prior work defines a tournament rule to be k-SNM-α if no set of ≤ k
teams can fix the ≤ (k
2
)
matches among them to increase their probability of winning by
> α and asks: for each k, what is the minimum α(k) such that a Condorcet-consistent
(i.e. always selects a Condorcet winner when one exists) k-SNM-α(k) tournament rule
exists?
A simple example witnesses that α(k) ≥ k−1
2k−1 for all k, and [16] conjectures that
this is tight (and prove it is tight for k = 2). Our first result refutes this conjecture:
there exists a sufficiently large k such that no Condorcet-consistent tournament rule is
k-SNM-1/2. Our second result leverages similar machinery to design a new tournament
rule which is k-SNM-2/3 for all k (and this is the first tournament rule which is k-SNM-
(< 1) for all k).
Our final result extends prior work, which proves that single-elimination bracket
with random seeding is 2-SNM-1/3 [16], in a different direction by seeking a stronger
notion of fairness than Condorcet-consistence. We design a new tournament rule,
which we call Randomized-King-of-the-Hill, which is 2-SNM-1/3 and cover-consistent
(the winner is an uncovered team with probability 1).
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1 Introduction
Consider n teams vying for a single championship via pairwise matches. A Tournament Rule
maps (possibly randomly) the outcome of all
(
n
2
)
matches to a single winner. A successful
tournament rule should on one hand be fair, in that it selects a team that could reasonably be
considered the best. For example, a tournament rule is Condorcet-consistent if whenever an
undefeated team exists, that team is selected as the winner with probability 1. On the other
hand, a successful tournament rule should also incentivize teams to win their matches. For
example in a monotone tournament rule, no team can increase their probability of winning
by throwing a match.
While numerous rules satisfy the two specific properties mentioned above, these hardly
suffice to call a tournament both fair and incentive compatible. Consider for example a
single-elimination tournament, which is Condorcet-consistent and monotone. One might
reasonably argue that single-elimination is unfair in the sense that a covered team may
win. That is, some team x, who is beaten by y, and for which all z who beat y also
beat x, could be crowned the champion (Observation 3), even though y is in some sense
clearly a superior team. When multiple teams come from the same organization (e.g. in the
Olympics where multiple teams from the same country participate, or in eSports where the
same organization sponsors multiple teams), one could also argue that single-elimination is
not incentive compatible: two teams from the same organization may wish to fix the match
between them so that the team with the best chance of winning gold advances.
Prior work establishes, however, that this stronger notion of incentive compatibility
(termed 2-Strongly Nonmanipulable by [1], and previously Pairwise Nonmanipulable in [2])
is incompatible even with the basic notion of Condorcet-consistence: no 2-SNM tournament
rule is Condorcet-consistent (recapped in Lemma 2.3). This motivated [1] to seek instead
tournaments that were 2-SNM and approximately Condorcet-consistent (i.e. guaranteed to
pick an undefeated team with probability at least α > 0, whenever one exists), and later [16]
to seek tournaments which were Condorcet-consistent and approximately 2-SNM (i.e. the
maximum probability with which two teams can improve their joint probability of winning
by fixing a match is α < 1, termed 2-SNM-α).
Like [16], we find it more reasonable to seek a tournament which is only approximately
strategyproof rather than one which is only approximately Condorcet-consistent: it is hard
to imagine a successful sporting event which sends an undefeated team home empty-handed.
The main result of [16] proves that a Single-Elimination Bracket with Random seeding
(RSEB, formally defined in Section 2) is both Condorcet-consistent and 2-SNM-1/3. This is
tight, as no Condorcet-consistent tournament is 2-SNM-α for any α < 1/3. They also define
a tournament to be k-SNM-α if no set of ≤ k teams can fix the ≤ (k2) matches between them
and improve their joint probability of winning by α, establish that no Condorcet-consistent
tournament rule is k-SNM-α for α < k−12k−1 (recapped in Lemma 2.3), and conjecture that this
is tight. The main open problem posed in their work is to prove this conjecture (recapped
in Question 1). The main results of this paper extend [16] in three different directions:
• First, we resolve the main open problem posed in [16] by refuting their conjecture (in-
cluding two weaker forms): There exists a sufficiently large k such that no Condorcet-
consistent tournament rule is k-SNM-1/2 (and therefore not k-SNM- k−12k−1 either).
• Second, we develop a new Condorcet-consistent tournament rule which is k-SNM-2/3
for all k. All tournament rules are trivially k-SNM-1 for all k, and this is the first
tournament rule known to be k-SNM-α for all k, for any α < 1.
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• Finally, we develop a new cover-consistent tournament rule which is 2-SNM-1/3, which
we call Randomized King-of-the-Hill (RKotH).
1.1 Theorem Statements, Roadmap, and Technical Highlights
After overviewing related work in Section 1.3, and establishing preliminaries in Section 2,
we develop machinery related to our first two results in Section 3. Specifically, consider
the following: there are two kinds of manipulations which may cause a set S of teams to
improve their joint probability of winning under a Condorcet-consistent tournament rule
r(·). First, perhaps S contains i and every team which beats i (for some i). Then S
can make i a Condorcet winner, and improve their joint probability of winning to 1 (the
maximum possible). Or, perhaps every team in S loses to at least one team outside S, but
S can increase their joint probability of winning anyway.
If, for a particular tournament graph T , we wish to ensure that no set S can improve
their joint probability of winning by more than α under r(·) by creating a Condorcet winner
in S, this is a fairly simple linear constraint: we must only ensure that for each team i,
the joint probability of winning (under r(T )) between i and all teams that beat i in T is at
least 1− α. For each tournament graph T , this reasoning gives a feasibility linear program
(with n variables corresponding to the probability that each team wins under r(T ), and
n linear constraints which depend on T ) that every winning-probability vector r(T ) must
satisfy in order for r(·) to possibly be k-SNM-α. Note that these constraints are by no means
sufficient to guarantee k-SNM-α, however, as we have completely ignored the second type
of constraints.
Inspired by this feasibility LP, we study a similar LP in Section 3, which we call the
Special Linear Program (SLP). In particular, we show that SLP has a unique solution, and
therefore well-defines a tournament rule (if the outcome of the matches is T , solve the SLP
parameterized by T and select according to these probabilities). In Section 4, we explain
why the SLP Tournament Rule is special: if any tournament rule is k-SNM-1/2 for all
k, then the SLP Tournament Rule is k-SNM-1/2 for all k. The remainder of Section 4
is then just a simple six team example witnessing that the SLP Tournament Rule is not
3-SNM-1/2 (and therefore not k-SNM-1/2 for all k, yielding our first main result:
Theorem. 1.1 There exists k < ∞ such that no Condorcet-consistent tournament rule is
k-SNM-1/2.
Note that Theorem 1.1 implies that (a) no Condorcet-consistent tournament rule is
simultaneously k-SNM- k−12k−1 for all k, (b) there exists a k for which no Condorcet-consistent
tournament rule is k-SNM- k−12k−1 , and (c) no Condorcet-consistent tournament rule is k-SNM-
1/2 for all k, thereby refuting the main conjecture of [16] along with two weaker conjectures.
We also wish to emphasize the following: in principle, if one wishes to determine whether
a particular tournament rule is k-SNM-α for tournaments of n teams, one could do an
exhaustive search over all 2(
n
2) tournament graphs (with some savings due to isomorphism),
and all
(
n
k
)
possible manipulating sets. This is a feasible search for small values of n, k.
If one wishes to determine whether there exists a rule that is k-SNM-α for tournaments
of n teams, one could still imagine an exhaustive search. But observe that the space of
tournament rules for n teams lies in n2(
n
2)-dimensional space, and it is hard to imagine a
successful exhaustive search beyond n = 10 (and even that is likely impossible).
Our proof establishes that no 939-SNM-1/2 tournament rule exists for n = 1878 teams,
and there is no hope of discovering this via exhaustive search. Indeed, our own exhaustive
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searches found numerous candidate rules which were k-SNM-1/2 on n teams for k, n ≤ 7
(indicating that large parameters are provably necessary before the conjecture is false). Yet,
the SLP Tournament Rule is already not 3-SNM-1/2 even for 6 teams (which we found via
exhaustive search), and the machinery of Sections 3 and 4 allows us to use this tiny example
to conclude that no 939-SNM-1/2 tournament rules exist for n = 1878 teams.
In Section 5, we show how to use the machinery developed in Section 3 to propose new
tournament rules. The main idea is the following: the SLP Tournament Rule, by design,
does a great job discouraging manipulations that produce a Condorcet winner. In fact, no
such manipulation benefits the manipulators by more than 1/2. Unfortunately, the rule
itself may still be only k-SNM-1 (due to manipulations which don’t produce a Condorcet
winner). However, we show that a convex combination of the SLP Tournament Rule with
the simple rule which selects a Condorcet winner when one exists, or a uniformly random
winner otherwise can leverage the SLP properties to be less manipulable:
Theorem. 1.2 There exists a Condorcet-consistent tournament rule that is k-SNM-2/3 for
all k.
Observation 1 The rule referred to in Theorem 1.2 is not monotone. We provide an
example of its non-monotonicity in Appendix B for completeness.
Finally, in Section 6, we shift gears and extend the results of [16] in a different direction.
Specifically, we design a new tournament rule Randomized King-of-the-Hill (RKotH ) which
is cover-consistent and 2-SNM-1/3. Each round, the rule checks if there is a team that
is a Condorcet winner. If there is one, it declares that team the winner and terminates.
Otherwise, it selects a uniformly random “prince” among the remaining teams, and then
removes it and every team which the prince beats. When there is only one team left, that
team is crowned champion. It is not hard to see that RKotH is cover-consistent, so the main
result of this section is that RKotH is 2-SNM-1/3. The main idea in the proof is that the
joint winning probability of {u, v} when v beats u is only higher than when u beats v if u
is selected as a prince while v still remains in contention, and at least one team which beats
either u or v remains in contention as well. We are then able to show that the probability
of this event is at most 1/3, and therefore the rule is 2-SNM-1/3.
Theorem. 1.3 Randomized King-of-the-Hill is cover-consistent and 2-SNM-1/3.
1.2 Extensions and Brief Discussion
While the main appeal of our results is clearly theoretical (it is hard to imagine a 939-
team coalition manipulating a real tournament), the events motivating a deep study of
fair and incentive compatible tournament rules are not purely hypothetical. In the popular
“group stage” format, strategic manipulations have occurred on the grandest stage, including
Badminton at the 2012 Olympics and the “disgrace of Gijo´n” in the 1982 World Cup.
But narrowing one’s focus exclusively to incentives (and, e.g., running a single-elimination
bracket) may have negative consequences for the quality of winner selected. For example in
the 2010 World Cup, eventual winners and second seed Spain lost their opening match to
Switzerland, who didn’t advance out of the group stage (the implication being that Spain
could be considered a “high quality winner” who would have been immediately eliminated
in a single-elimination bracket). So while our particular results are valuable mostly for
their theoretical contributions, the surrounding literature provides valuable insight on the
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tradeoff between incentive compatibility of the winner selection process and quality of the
winner selected.
We also wish to briefly note that while we formally define SNM only for deterministic
tournaments (i.e. the teams try to manipulate from a fixed tournament graph T to another
fixed tournament graph T ′), [16] establishes that all results extend to (arbitrarily correlated)
distributions over tournament graphs as well (where the “real” outcomes may be a distri-
bution T over tournament graphs, and the coalition may try to manipulate to a different
distribution T ′). We refer the reader to [16] for a formal statement, but the main idea
is that any lower bounds immediately carry over, while for every rule the largest possible
manipulation occurs on a deterministic instance anyway (so positive results carry over as
well).
1.3 Related work
The most related works have already been discussed above: [2] first introduces the termi-
nology used for these problems (and establishes that no deterministic tournament rule is
2-SNM), [1] first considers randomized tournament rules and designs tournament rules which
are 2-SNM but only approximately Condorcet-consistent. [16] is the most closely related,
which also considers rules which are Condorcet-consistent and approximately incentive com-
patible. Our work can most appropriately be viewed as extending [16] in multiple directions
(including resolving their main open problem) as detailed in Section 1.
Also related are some recent works which rigorously analyze the manipulability of specific
tournament formats (most notably, the World Cup and related qualifying procedures) [5, 14].
Incentive compatibility of voting rules has an enormous history, dating back at least
to seminal works of [3, 7, 8, 15]. While there are obvious conceptual connections between
voting rules and tournament rules (e.g. any tournament rule can be used as a voting rule:
call the “match” between alternatives x and y won by x if more voters prefer x to y), the
notions of manipulability are quite different. In a voting rule, a voter has a tiny role to play
in every single “match,” whereas in a tournament, the teams themselves can manipulate
only matches that involve them. So there is little technical (and even conceptual) similarity
between works which study incentives in voting rules versus tournament rules.
The notion of uncovered teams is also extremely well-studied in computational social
choice theory (see, e.g., [4, 11], the latter attributes the concept’s introduction to [6] and [13]
independently). Additionally, an uncovered team is equivalent to the notion of a “king” [17]
(a team x such that for all teams y, either x beats y or there exists a z who beats y
such that x beats z – not to be confused with the kings of our hill) in works which study
how a single-elimination bracket designer can rig the seeding to make a particular team
win [10, 18, 19] or sufficient conditions under which a covered team can be crowned winner
of a single-elimination bracket [9]. The volume of these works certainly help establish that
cover-consistence is a valuable endeavor beyond Condorcet-consistence, but otherwise bear
no technical similarity to our work. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to
consider cover-consistence jointly with a notion of incentive compatibility.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we introduce notation, and develop some concepts that will be relevant
throughout the paper, consistent with prior work [1, 16].
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Definition 2.1 (Tournament) A (round robin) tournament T on n teams is a complete,
directed graph on n vertices whose edges denote the outcome of a match between two teams.
Team i beats team j if the edge between them points from i to j. Tn denotes the set of all
n-team tournaments.
Definition 2.2 (Tournament Rule) A tournament rule r is a function r : Tn → ∆([n])
that maps n-team tournaments T ∈ Tn to a distribution over teams, where ri(T ) = Pr(r(T ) =
i) denotes the probability with which team i is declared the winner of tournament T under
rule r. We will often abuse notation and refer to r as a collection of tournament rules
{r1(·), . . . , rn(·), . . .}, of which exactly one operates on Tn (for all n).
Like prior work, we will be interested in tournaments which satisfy natural properties.
For instance, [16] concerned tournaments which always select a Condorcet winner, when one
exists. Below are the main properties we consider in this paper.
Definition 2.3 (Condorcet-consistent) Team i is a Condorcet winner of a tournament
T if i beats every other team according to T . A tournament rule r is Condorcet-consistent
if for every tournament T with a Condorcet winner i, ri(T ) = 1 (i.e. the tournament rule
always declares the Condorcet winner as the winner of T ).
Definition 2.4 (cover-consistent) Team i covers team j under T if (a) i beats j and (b)
every k /∈ {i, j} which beats i also beats j. A team is covered if it is covered by at least one
team. A tournament rule r is cover-consistent if for all T , rj(T ) = 0 when j is covered.
Observation 2 Every cover-consistent rule is Condorcet-consistent.
Proof. If T has no Condorcet winner, then a Condorcet-consistent rule can be aribtrary
on T . If T has a Condorcet winner i, then i is the only uncovered team. Therefore, any
cover-consistent rule will have ri(T ) = 1, and is Condorcet-consistent as well.
Intuitively, one should think of i covering j to mean that any reasonable evaluation should
declare team i better than team j. Cover-consistence proposes that no team should win if
they are inferior to another by any reasonable evaluation, but does not always propose who
the winner should be. Condorcet-consistence can therefore be interpreted as a relaxation of
cover-consistence, which only binds when cover-consistence would propose a unique winner.
The following lemma establishes this formally.
Lemma 2.1 (Restated Theorem 4 from [12]) Whenever tournament T has a unique
uncovered team i, i is a Condorcet winner in T .
Proof. We first claim that the covering relation is transitive: if i covers j and j covers k,
then i covers k. Indeed, let S(k) denote the teams that k defeats, S(j) for j, and S(i) for i.
Then as j covers k and i covers j, we have S(k)∪ {k} ⊆ S(j) ⊆ S(i), meaning that i covers
k.
Therefore, if we draw the directed graph G(T ) with an edge from j to k iff j covers k,
the graph must be acyclic. If not, then the work above establishes that a path from j to
k implies that j covers k, while a path from k to j implies that k covers j, a contradiction
(as we cannot have both that j beats k and k beats j). Uncovered teams are exactly those
with indegree 0 in G(T ). If there is a unique such team i, then there must be a path
from i to every other team j (follow edges backwards starting from j. This process must
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terminate, and can only terminate at a team with indegree 0, which must be i). Therefore,
i covers every other team j, which in particular implies that i beats every other team j and
is therefore a Condorcet winner.
The above conditions concern natural properties of the winner selected, and essentially
say that good tournaments should never select obviously inferior teams as their winner. We
are also concerned with properties regarding the procedure by which the winner is selected,
and in particular how manipulable this procedure is. We formalize these properties below
(which are proposed in [1, 16]).
Definition 2.5 (S-Adjacent Tournaments) Two tournaments T, T ′ ∈ Tn are S-adjacent
when the outcomes of all matches in T, T ′ are identical, except matches between two teams
in S ⊆ [n]. Formally, for all i, j ∈ [n], if |{i, j} ∩ S| < 2, then the edge between i and j
in T is identical to the one in T ′. Less formally, T and T ′ are S-adjacent if teams in S
can manipulate the outcomes of matches only between pairs of teams in S and cause the
tournament results to change from T to T ′.
Definition 2.6 (k-SNM-α) A tournament rule r is k-strongly non-manipulable at proba-
bility α (henceforth k-SNM-α) if for all subsets S ⊆ [n] with |S| ≤ k, and all pairs T, T ′
of S-adjacent tournaments,
∑
i∈S(ri(T )− ri(T ′)) ≤ α. Informally, if a set S of ≤ k teams
decide to manipulate their pairwise matches, they cannot improve the probability that the
winner is in S by more than α. We abuse notation and use ∞-SNM-α to refer to a tourna-
ment rule which is k-SNM-α for all k.
2.1 Technical Recap of Prior Work
Finally, let’s recap [16], which serves as the starting point for our work. Their main result
establishes that the Random Single-Elimination Bracket (formally defined below) is 2-SNM-
1/3.
Definition 2.7 (Random Single-Elimination Bracket) The Random Single-Elimination
Bracket (RSEB) rule places n teams uniformly at random among 2dlog2 ne seeds 1 (and fills
the remaining seeds with byes)2. Then, a single-elimination tournament is played with these
seeds to determine the winner. That is, whenever i meets j in the bracket, T determines
which team advances to the next round, and the other team is eliminated. Note that the only
randomness in the rule is in the seeding.
Theorem. 2.2 ([16]) RSEB is 2-SNM-1/3 and Condorcet-consistent.
The following explicit tournament was also used in [16] for lower bounds:
Definition 2.8 (Balanced Tournament) The k-balanced tournament is the tournament
TBal ∈ T2k−1 where team i beats exactly the k − 1 teams in {i + 1, i + 2, ..., i + k − 1
mod (2k − 1)}.
Lemma 2.3 ([16]) No Condorcet-consistent Tournament rule is k-SNM-α for any α <
k−1
2k−1 .
1A seed is a position in the tournament bracket associated to a specific number.
2A bye is a dummy team that loses to all non-bye teams.
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Figure 1: In this example there exists a bracket where a covered team A (covered by H)
may still be declared the winner.
Proof Sketch Consider r(TBal). There exists some adjacent set of teams S = {i − k + 1
(mod 2k− 1), . . . , i} of size k which together win with probability at most k2k−1 in r(TBal).
These teams can make i into a Condorcet winner, which necessarily wins with probability
1. Therefore, for any r(·), some set of size k can gain at least k−12k−1 by manipulating when
the original tournament is TBal.
Inspired by the tightness of Theorem 2.2 with the simple balanced tournament TBal, [16]
conjectured that same simple tournament was tight for larger k:
Open Question 1 ([16]) Does there exist a tournament rule that is Condorcet-consistent
and k-SNM- k2k−1 for all k? What about a family of rules F such that for all k, Fk is
k-SNM- k−12k−1? What about a rule that is k-SNM-1/2 for all k?
The first results of this paper refute all three conjectures from [16] and resolve Ques-
tion 1. The following results concern the difference between Condorcet-consistence and
cover-consistence, as the following observation shows that RSEB is not cover-consistent.
Observation 3 RSEB is not cover-consistent.
Proof. Consider a tournament with eight teams A,B,C,D,E, F,G,H, where A beats ex-
actly {B,C,E}, and H beats exactly {A,B,C,E}. C beats D, E beats F , E beats G. Any
matches not explicitly stated can be arbitrarily decided. Consider the seeded bracket shown
in Figure 1. This bracket shows A can win with non-zero probability. But H covers A.
Therefore, RSEB is not cover-consistent.
2.2 Linear Algebra Preliminaries
Some of our proofs require linear algebra. Below are facts that we use, both proofs are in
Appendix A.
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Definition 2.9 (Unit Skew Symmetric Matrix) An n × n matrix A ∈ Rn×n is unit
skew symmetric if |Aij | = 1 ∀i 6= j, and Aij = −Aji ∀i, j.
Proposition 2.4 If A is a unit skew symmetric matrix and n is even, rank(A) = n. If n
is odd rank(A) = n− 1.
Proposition 2.5 Let ε ∈ R≥0, A ∈ Rm×n, and ~b ∈ Rm and denote by Pε := {~x,A · ~x ≥
~b− ε~1} ∩ [0, 1]n. Then for all δ > 0, there exists a sufficiently small ε > 0 such that:
max
~y∈Pε
{d`1(P0, ~y)} ≤ δ,
where d`1(S, ~x) = min~y∈S{|~x− ~y|1}.
3 A special Linear Program SLP (T )
In this section we present a linear program SLP (T ) and characterize its optimal solutions.
The analysis of SLP (T ) is the main tool which allows us to conclude both the non-existence
of rules which are ∞-SNM-1/2 (Section 4) and the existence of a rule which is ∞-SNM-2/3
(Section 5). The main result of this section is Proposition 3.4, which states that SLP (T )
has a unique solution, and therefore yields a well-defined tournament rule. In Section 4 we
show that a tournament rule that is ∞-SNM-1/2 exists if and only if this particular rule is
k-SNM-1/2 (and subsequently show that this rule is not k-SNM-1/2 via Proposition 3.4).
We now proceed. Let T be a tournament graph and let δ−T (v) denote the set of teams
that beat v in T (and δ+T (v) the set that v beats). Then SLP (T ) is the following:
SLP (T ):
minimize
n∑
i=1
pi
subject to
∑
j∈δ−T (i)
pj +
1
2
pi ≥ 1
2
∀i ∈ [n]
pi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ [n]
Before further proceeding, let’s get some (informal) intuition for why SLP (T ) is possibly
related to Question 1. Starting from a tournament rule r, if we define pi := ri(T ), then∑
i pi = 1, pi ≥ 0 for all i. Moreover, if r is ∞-SNM-1/2, it must be that for all i,∑
j∈δ−T (i) pj + pi ≥ 1/2. If not, then i together with δ
−
T (i) could collude to make i a
Condorcet winner, and i would win with probability 1. So the initial probability of winning
for i together with δ−T (i) must have been at least 1/2.
Of course, the afore-described constraints seem very weak in comparison to all of the
constraints imposed by k-SNM-1/2. In particular, they only guarantee that no coalition
can gain by making one of their members into a Condorcet winner (but do not guarantee
that no coalition can otherwise gain by manipulating their matches). Notice now that the
constraints in SLP (T ) are slightly stronger than this (because they have a multiplier of 1/2
instead of 1 in front of pi in the constraint for i). In particular, the constraints in SLP (T )
imply Condorcet-consistence (while the afore-mentioned do not): if i is a Condorcet winner,
then δ−T (i) = ∅ and the constraint reads pi/2 ≥ 1/2 as desired. Of course, we’ve yet to
establish a formal relationship, but at this point the reader may have some intuition for
9
a connection between a profile of solutions to SLP (T ) with
∑
i pi ≤ 1 (for all T ) and
Condorcet-consistent tournament rules which are ∞-SNM-1/2.
We postpone a formal discussion of this connection (as this connection is the entire
focus of Section 4), but note here that it is not particularly direct. For example, a profile
of solutions to SLP (T ) for all T ∈ Tn does not imply a tournament rule for n teams which
is ∞-SNM-1/2. Similarly, an ∞-SNM-1/2 tournament rule for n teams does not imply a
profile of solutions to SLP (T ) for all T ∈ Tn. However, we show that ∞-SNM-1/2 rules
exist for all n if and only if for all n, the rule defined via profiles of solutions to SLP (T ) is
∞-SNM-1/2 (i.e. we will relate this LP on n teams to tournament rules for  n teams).
We now begin our analysis of SLP (T ) by taking the dual, and refer to it as DSLP (T ).
Below, we use ri as the dual variable for the constraint corresponding to team i. On the
left-hand side, we’ve taken the dual directly. On the right hand side, we did a change of
variables and redefined qi := ri/2 (so the two programs below are identical).
DSLP (T ):
maximize
n∑
i=1
ri/2 maximize
n∑
i=1
qi
subject to
∑
j∈δ+T (i)
rj +
1
2
ri ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ [n] subject to
∑
j∈δ+T (i)
qj +
1
2
qi ≤ 1
2
∀i ∈ [n]
ri ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ [n] qi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ [n]
We now prove that the optimal value of SLP (T ) is always 1. This is stated in Corol-
lary 3.2, which uses Lemma 3.1 as a building block.
Lemma 3.1 Suppose there exists a feasible solution ~p to SLP (T ) with
∑
i∈[n] pi = c. Then
~q with qi := pi · 12c−1 is a feasible solution to DSLP (T ) with value c2c−1 . Likewise, if there
exists a feasible solution ~q to DSLP (T ) with
∑
i∈[n] qi = c. Then ~p with pi := qi · 12c−1 , ~p is
a feasible solution to SLP (T ) with value c2c−1 .
Proof. Consider any solution ~p with
∑
i pi = c. First, we observe that we must have
c > 1/2. If not, there certainly exists some i with
∑
j∈δ−T (i) pj+pi/2 < 1/2, and a constraint
is violated (to see this, observe that maybe c = 0, in which case all the constraints are
violated. Or 0 < c ≤ 1/2, in which case we can take i to be any i with pi > 0). Then because∑
j∈δ−T (i) pj+pi/2 ≥ 1/2, we must have
∑
j∈δ+T (i) pj+pi/2 ≤ c−1/2. As qi := pi/(2c−1), we
immediately conclude that
∑
j∈δ+T (i) qj + qi/2 ≤
c−1/2
2c−1 = 1/2. Also, as c > 1/2, each qi ≥ 0
(and is well-defined). Therefore, ~q is feasible for DSLP (T ), and it’s clear that
∑
i qi =
c
2c−1 .
The other direction follows from identical calculations.
Corollary 3.2 SLP (T ) always has an optimal solution with value 1.
Proof. It is clear that SLP (T ) is feasible for all T , since setting pi = 1 for all i is a feasible
solution. Suppose we had a primal solution ~p with value c < 1. Applying Lemma 3.1, we can
conclude ~q would be a dual solution with value c2c−1 > c. By weak LP duality, the existence
of such a dual would verify that there are no primal solutions with value c, a contradiction.
Similarly, suppose we had an optimal primal solution ~p with value c > 1. This implies
there is an optimal dual solution ~q with value c > 1. Applying the opposite direction of
Lemma 3.1 we can conclude there is a primal solution with value c2c−1 < c, a contradiction.
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Now that we know the optimal value of SLP (T ), we wish to understand its optimal
solution. We now begin taking steps towards characterizing the solution (and in particular,
that it is unique).
Corollary 3.3 Let ~p be an optimal solution to SLP (T ). Then for all i s.t pi > 0 and for
all optimal solutions ~w to SLP (T ),
∑
j∈δ−T (i) wj +
1
2wi =
1
2 .
Proof. If we apply Lemma 3.1 to ~p (which has |~p|1 = 1 by Corollary 3.2), we conclude ~p
is also a feasible dual solution. Hence, ~p is an optimal dual solution (as it has equal value
in both the primal and the dual). Now consider applying the complementary slackness
conditions for the alternative optimal primal ~w, and optimal dual solution ~p. If pi > 0, we
know that the corresponding primal constraint in ~w must be tight. This exactly states that∑
j∈δ−T (i) wj +
1
2wi =
1
2 whenever pi > 0.
Proposition 3.4 The optimal solution ~p to SLP (T ) is unique.
Proof. By Corollary 3.2, we know that all solutions to SLP (T ) have value 1. Assume
toward contradiction there exist two distinct solutions, ~p and ~q to SLP (T ) such that |~p|1 = 1
and |~q|1 = 1. Let P = {i : pi > 0} and let Q = {i : qi > 0}. Let A be the unit skew
symmetric matrix where Aij = 1 if i beats j in T and −1 otherwise, with Aii = 0. By
Corollary 3.3, we know for all i in P ∪Q that∑
j∈δ−T (i)
qj +
1
2
qi = 1/2
which implies for those same i ∈ Q ∪ P that (because ∑j qj = 1)
(A · p)i =
∑
j∈δ+T (i)
qj −
∑
j∈δ−T (i)
qj = 0.
Now, let A′ denote the submatrix A restricted only to rows and columns in P ∪Q. Let ~p′
and ~q′ be the vectors ~p and ~q (respectively) restricted also to the entries in P ∪Q. Observe
now that (A′ · ~p′)i = (A · ~p)i = 0 for all i, and also that (A′ ·~q′)i = (A ·~q)i = 0 (both of these
follow because we have simply deleted all non-zero entries of A · ~p and A · ~q by restricting
to P ∪Q).
Now we are ready to derive our contradiction. The above paragraph concludes that
both ~p′ and ~q′ are in the null space of A′, which is a unit skew symmetric matrix. But
also |~p|1 = |~q|1, meaning that the null space of A′ must have dimension at least 2. But this
contradicts Proposition 2.4, which claims that the dimension can be at most 1. We therefore
conclude that no such distinct ~p, ~q can exist.
Now that we know the solution to SLP (T ) is unique, and has
∑
i pi = 1, it yields a
well-defined tournament rule, which is the main takeaway from this section:
Definition 3.1 (SLP Tournament Rule) Let ~p(T ) denote the (unique, by Proposition 3.4)
solution to SLP (T ). Define the SLP Tournament Rule to select i as the winner with prob-
ability pi(T ) on input T .
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4 No Condorcet-consistent ∞-SNM-1/2 Rule Exists
In this section we leverage our analysis of SLP to prove Theorem 1.1. First, we make
the connection between rules that are k-SNM-α and SLP, by introducing a series of linear
programs and relaxations.
Recall that for a Condorcet-consistent tournament rule r to be k-SNM-α, it must be
that no coalition of size k can gain more than α probability of winning by manipulat-
ing the pairwise matches between them. In particular, if |δ−T (v)| < k, it must be that
ri(T ) +
∑
j∈δ−T (v) rj(T ) ≥ 1−α. Otherwise the set δ
−
T (v)∪{v} can collude to make i a Con-
dorcet winner. Formally, any k-SNM-α rule must satisfy the following feasibility LP0(T, α, k)
for all tournaments T .
LP0(T, α, k):
pi +
∑
j∈δ−T (i)
pj ≥ 1− α ∀i ∈ [n] such that |δ−T (i)| ≤ k − 1
∑
∀v
pi = 1
pi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ [n]
Note that any k-SNM-α rule certainly satisfies LP0(T, α, k) for all T , but that a profile
of solutions to LP0 for all T ∈ Tn does not necessarily imply a rule which is k-SNM-α (as
the LP only considers deviations which produce a Condorcet winner). Note also that the
k-balanced tournament witnesses that no rule satisfies LP0(T, α, k) for any α <
k−1
2k−1 . We
will also consider the case where k →∞ (and therefore, all i ∈ [n] have |δ−T (i)| ≤ k− 1, and
refer to this LP simply as LP0(T, α) := LP0(T, α,∞)).
Our first step will be switching from LP0(T, α) to LP1(T, α, z) for z ≥ 1. Below, observe
that we have made two changes. The first is insignificant: we’ve phrased LP1(T, α, z) as a
minimization LP instead of a feasibility LP. The second is a strengthening: we’ve changed
the multiplier of pi in the constraint corresponding to i from 1 to
z
2z−1 ≤ 1 (so the space of
feasible solutions is smaller).
LP1(T, α, z):
minimize
n∑
j=1
pj
subject to
∑
j∈δ−T (i)
pj +
z
2z − 1pi ≥ 1− α ∀i ∈ [n]
pi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ [n]
Observe that LP1(T, 1/2, z) is a relaxation of SLP (T ) (the only difference is a multiplier
of z2z−1 > 1/2 in front of pi in the constraint corresponding to i). The main step in this
section is Lemma 4.1 below, which formally connects LP1(T, 1/2, z) to k-SNM-α rules.
Lemma 4.1 If for all n there exists a tournament rule r(·) which is ∞-SNM-α, then for
all z ∈ N+ and all n, there exists a tournament rule w(·) which is ∞-SNM-α and for which
w(T ) is a feasible solution to LP1(T, α, z) with
∑
i pi = 1 for all T .
Similarly, if for all n there exists a tournament rule r(·) which is k-SNM-α, then for all
z ∈ N+ and all n, there exists a tournament rule w(·) which is k2z−1 -SNM-α and for which
w(T ) is a feasible solution to LP1(T, α, z) with
∑
i pi = 1 for all T .
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Figure 2: A tournament T and its associated construction T ′, as described in the proof of
Lemma 4.1 for z = 3. The outcomes of the games between teams in different groups of
nodes in T ′ mimic the outcomes of the games between the original nodes in T .
Proof. Consider an arbitrary tournament T with n teams, and consider a related tour-
nament T ′ with n(2z − 1) teams, labeled vij , for i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [2z − 1]. Conceptually,
think that we have split each original team into a group of 2z − 1 copies. For i 6= j, and
x, y ∈ [2z − 1], have vix beat vjy in T ′ if and only if vi beat vj in T (that is, match results
in T are preserved between different groups in T ′). Within each group, have vix beat viy in
T ′ iff x < y < x + z (mod 2z − 1) (so each group is isomorphic to the z-balanced tourna-
ment, recall Definition 2.8 and see Figure 2 for a small example). Let G(i) denote i’s group,
G(i) := {vij , j ∈ [2z − 1]}.
Now, we wish to claim that if r(·) is a rule that is ∞-SNM-α (respectively, k-SNM-α)
for n(2z− 1) teams, and we define w(T ) so that wi(T ) :=
∑2z−1
j=1 rij(T
′), then w(·) is a rule
that is ∞-SNM-α (respectively, k2z−1 -SNM-α) for n teams, and w(T ) is a feasible solution
to LP1(T, α, z) for all T .
Let’s first confirm that w(T ) is a feasible solution to LP1(T, α, z) with
∑
i pi = 1.
The latter statement is clear: as r(·) is a tournament rule, we have ∑i pi = ∑i wi(T ) =∑
ij ri,j(T ) = 1. Next, it is also clear that pi ≥ 0 for all i, so we just need to check that∑
j∈δ−T (i) pj +
z
2z−1pi ≥ 1− α.
To this end, we know that there exists some adjacent set of z teams in G(i) such that
the total probability that these teams win is at most z2z−1 · pi. Call this set Sx and let vix
denote the team in this set which loses to the others. Then the set of teams ∪j∈δ−T (i)G(j)∪Sx
together can create a Condorcet winner (vix) in T
′. Therefore, we get that this set of teams
must have won with probability at least 1 − α under r(·), and by definition of w(·) (and
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the choice of Sx above), we immediately get that
∑
j∈δ−T (i) wj(T ) +
z
2z−1wi(T ) ≥ 1− α, as
desired.
So now we know that w(·) satisfies LP1(T, α, z) with
∑
i pi = 1 for all T . We now need to
confirm that it is also∞-SNM-α (respectively, k2z−1 -SNM-α). But suppose for contradiction
that w(·) was not k-SNM-α for some k (respectively, k2z−1 -SNM-α). This would imply the
existence of tournaments T1 and T2 that are S-adjacent for some set S ⊆ [n] (respectively,
S ⊆ [n], with |S| ≤ k2z−1 ) where
∑
i∈S wi(T1) −
∑
i∈S wi(T2) > α. If we let T
′
1 and T
′
2
represent the corresponding tournaments that determined the values of T1 and T2 from r(·)
respectively, and let S′ = ∪i∈SG(i), we can conclude
∑
i∈S′ ri(T
′
1) −
∑
i∈S′ ri(T
′
2) > α,
contradicting the fact that r is ∞-SNM-α (respectively, that r is k-SNM-α, as |S′| = |S| ·
(2z − 1) and |S| ≤ k2z−1 ).
With Lemma 4.1 in hand, we’re very close to our goal. In particular, we’ve now shown
that ∞-SNM-α rules exist for all n if and only if ∞-SNM-α rules exist for all n which
additionally satisfy the constraints in LP1(T, α, z) for all z ∈ N+. Note that as z →∞, the
constraints of LP1(T, 1/2, z) approach those of SLP (T ). So one might reasonably expect
that SLP (T ) can be used in place of LP1(T, 1/2, z) above, specifically when α = 1/2.
Indeed, this is the case (and the only place where we use Proposition 2.5).
Theorem. 4.2 There exists an ∞-SNM-1/2 tournament rule for all n if and only if the
SLP Tournament Rule is ∞-SNM-1/2 for all n.
Moreover, if the SLP Tournament Rule is not ∞-SNM-1/2 for all n, there exists a
k, n <∞ such that no k-SNM-1/2 Tournament Rule exists on n teams.
Proof. The proof follows from a proper application of Lemma 4.1 and Proposition 2.5.
Suppose towards contradiction that the SLP Tournament Rule is not k-SNM-1/2 for some
k, n. This implies that there must be some tournaments T, T ′ ∈ Tn and manipulating set S
which verify this fact by gaining probability c > 12 . Call A(T ), b(T ) be the constraint matrix
and vector of SLP (T ), respectively, when written in standard form (i.e. A(T ) has n rows,
corresponding to the n non-trivial constraints in SLP (T ). b(T ) is just the n-dimensional
vector of all 1/2s).
Now apply Proposition 2.5 with A := A(T ) and b := b(T ), with δ =
c− 12
4 , and let ε(T ) be
the promised ε. Do the same for T ′, and set ε = min{ε(T ), ε(T ′)}. Pick now a sufficiently
large z such that z2z−1 − 12 ≤ ε (such a z exists as ε > 0).
Now, observe that any feasible solution ~x for LP1(T, 1/2, z) satisfies A(T ) · ~x ≥ ~b − ε~1
(and any feasible solution ~y for LP1(T
′, 1/2, z) satisfies A(T ′) · ~y ≥ ~b − ε~1). If there is
an ∞-SNM-1/2 tournament rule (respectively, k-SNM-1/2 tournament rule, for k to be
chosen later), Lemma 4.1 tells us that there exists an∞-SNM-1/2 (respectively, k2z−1 -SNM-
1/2) tournament rule y such that y(T ) is feasible for LP1(T, 1/2, z) and y(T
′) is feasible
for LP1(T
′, 1/2, z). So we know A(T ) · y(T ) ≥ ~b − ε · ~1, and also that A(T ′) · y(T ′) ≥
~b− ε ·~1. Proposition 2.5 then allows us to conclude that |y(T )− w(T )|1 ≤ δ, and also that
|y(T ′)−w(T ′)|1 ≤ δ. But now we are ready to derive a contradiction and claim that in fact
y(·) is not ∞-SNM-1/2. Indeed, we know that∑
v∈S
wv(T )− wv(T ′) ≥ c,
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by definition of S, T, T ′. But from the triangle inequality, we get that:∑
v∈S
wv(T )− yv(T ) ≤
∑
v∈S
|wv(T )− yv(T )| ≤ |w(T )− y(T )|1 ≤ δ,
∑
v∈S
yv(T
′)− wv(T ′) ≤
∑
v∈S
|wv(T ′)− yv(T ′)| ≤ |w(T ′)− y(T ′)|1 ≤ δ.
Summing these three equations then yields:∑
v∈S
y(T )v − y(T ′)v + 2δ ≥ c ⇒
∑
v∈S
y(T )v − y(T ′)v ≥
c+ 12
2
>
1
2
.
This contradicts that y(·) was ∞-SNM-1/2 (and contradicts that y(·) is k2z−1 -SNM-1/2, as
long as |S| ≤ k2z−1 , or k ≥ |S|(2z− 1). Note that k can indeed be defined after z and S), as
now S can manipulate from T ′ to T and gain > 1/2.
To briefly recap the entire proof of Theorem 4.2: we first showed that the existence of
∞-SNM-α rules imply the existence of specific kinds of∞-SNM-α rules (those which satisfy
LP1(T, α, z) for all z ∈ N+). Note that we relied on the existence of ∞-SNM-α rules for
n′  n in order to show the existence of our specialized ∞-SNM-α rules for n. Then, we
showed that for α = 1/2, the existence of specialized rules implies that a particular rule
(the SLP Tournament Rule) is ∞-SNM-1/2 (and the fact that the SLP Tournament Rule is
well-defined is the focus of Section 4).
Now, we make use of Theorem 4.2 by proving that the SLP Tournament Rule is not
∞-SNM-1/2.
Lemma 4.3 The SLP Tournament Rule is not ∞-SNM-1/2.
Proof. See Figure 3 where two {B,C,E}-adjacent tournaments are evaluated under the
SLP Tournament Rule. The three teams {B,C,E} together have probability 4/9 under
T , but 1 under T ′, and therefore gain 5/9 > 1/2 by manipulating. So the rule is not
∞-SNM-1/2.
Note that in order to verify that we have computed the SLP Tournament Rule correctly
on T and T ′, the reader need only verify (in each graph) that the probabilities sum to 1,
and the SLP constraints: for all i,
∑
j∈δ−T (i) pj + pi/2 ≥ 1/2. By Proposition 3.4, any such
solution is the unique optimum, and therefore output by the SLP Tournament Rule.
Proof of Theorem 1.1 The proof of Theorem 1.1 now follows immediately from Theo-
rem 4.2 and Lemma 4.3.
4.1 Concluding Thoughts on Lower Bounds
We emphasize again that our lower bounds reduce the problem of determining existence
of Condorcet-consistent ∞-SNM-1/2 tournament rules for large n′  n to the problem
of determining whether the specific SLP Tournament Rule is ∞-SNM-1/2 for small n. In
particular, now that we have a specific n, k for which the SLP Tournament Rule is not k-
SNM-1/2 on n teams, we can backtrack through Theorem 4.2 and recover a specific k′, n′
for which no k′-SNM-1/2 (and therefore no k′-SNM- k
′−1
2k′−1 ) Tournament Rule exists on n
′
teams:
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Figure 3: The tournaments T, T ′ are {B,C,E} adjacent. The distribution of winners as
prescribed by SLP is provided below each tournament, where the teams are presented al-
phabetically. Note that under T , the collision wins with chance 4/9 but in T ′ they win with
probability 1, gaining 5/9.
In our example, there are n = 6 teams, and the SLP Tournament Rule is not better
than 3-SNM-5/9. So we may take c = 5/9 in the proof of Theorem 4.2, which results in
δ = 1/72. Note that ε is now a function of δ via Proposition 2.5, and is ≈ 0.0016, so we’d
set z := d 1/2+ε2ε e = 157. This therefore rules out the possibility of a tournament rule that is
939-SNM-1/2 for 1878 teams. While of course portions of the proof of Theorem 4.2 could be
optimized to yield a smaller k′, n′, the point we are trying to make is that there could very
well be k-SNM-1/2 tournament rules for n teams for quite large values of k, n, and there
is virtually no hope of uncovering the non-existence for extremely large k via exhaustive
search — recall that the space of tournament rules is all functions from the 2(
n
2) different
complete directed graphs on n teams to the n-dimensional simplex (indeed, the authors
had no luck via exhaustive search, and numerous rules appeared k-SNM-1/2 for small n
in simulations). However, the machinery developed in this section allows us to brute-force
search for manipulations of a single tournament, which happened to resolve for k = 3, n = 6
and conclude our desired claim, which would have required a significantly larger exhaust for
significantly larger k′, n′.
Finally, we note that it may be tempting to use our machinery, almost as is, to rule out
Condorcet-consistent ∞-SNM-α rules for α > 1/2. In particular, it is tempting to conclude
that because Figure 3 exhibits that the SLP Tournament Rule is no better than 3-SNM-5/9,
that there should not be an ∞-SNM-5/9 tournament rule for all n. Note, however, that the
SLP is really special for α = 1/2. Indeed, if we were to replace 1/2 with 4/9 in the SLP, we
would (for instance) no longer have a unique solution. Therefore, we’d lose the well-defined
SLP Tournament Rule, and still have to do a broad exhaustive search, and significantly
new ideas would be needed to get leverage out of this. Still, while our current tools only
preclude rules which are∞-SNM-1/2 (and ever so slightly more: ∞-SNM-.50016 via similar
reasoning to the previous paragraph), it is reasonable to expect that our general approach
(e.g. Lemma 4.1) may help rule out the existence of SNM-α tournament rules for α > 1/2.
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5 Less Manipulable Tournament Rules via SLP
In this section we prove Theorem 1.2: an ∞-SNM-2/3 tournament rule exists (for all n).
Fortunately, a lot of the work has been done in Sections 3 and 4 in the form of our under-
standing of how feasible solutions to SLP (T ) and LP0(T, β, k) relate. We first show how
any k-SNM-α rule that is a valid solution to LP0(T, β, k) (for some β) can be transformed
into a k-SNM- αα−β+1 rule. This transformation yields a stronger tournament rule if α ≥ β.
Our proof then exploits the fact that an optimal solution to SLP (T ) satisfies LP0(T, 1/2, k)
by design and, trivially, is ∞-SNM-1. The naive upper bound of α ≤ 1 suffices to yield a
∞-SNM-2/3 rule (previously no ∞-SNM-< 1 rule is known). Moreover, this reduction now
allows any improved bounds (even if  2/3) on the manipulability of the SLP Tournament
Rule to imply tournament rules which are∞-SNM-α for α < 2/3. Below is the main lemma
of this section.
Lemma 5.1 (Augmentation Lemma) Let tournament rule r(·) be such that r(T ) sat-
isfies LP0(T, β, k) for all tournaments T , and be k-SNM-α. Then a tournament rule w(·)
exists which is k-SNM- αα−β+1 .
Proof. Consider the following rule: pick a c ∈ [0, 1] (to be chosen later). Set wi(T ) =
ri(T ) · c + 1−cn , if T does not have a Condorcet winner. If T has a Condorcet winner,
allocate probability 1 to the Condorcet winner.
To evaluate the manipulability of this rule, first consider a manipulating set which creates
a Condorcet winner. The total probability gained is at most β · c + (1 − c). To see this,
observe that because the set can create a Condorcet winner, they must have total probability
at least β under r(·) (and therefore at least β · c after scaling down by c).
Now consider a manipulating set that does not create a Condorcet winner. Then there
is certainly no Condorcet winner in T ′, and so the extra (1 − c) probability mass is still
allocated uniformly (and the set gains nothing here). So the set can only gain what they
would by manipulating under r(·) (scaled down by c), which is at most α · c.
To minimize max{αc, βc+ (1− c)}, set c := 1α−β+1 . This results in w(·) being k-SNM-
α
α−β+1 .
Proof of Theorem 1.2 By construction the SLP Tournament Rule is Condorcet-consistent,
and is feasible for LP0(T,
1
2 , k) for all k. Thus the SLP Tournament Rule satisfies the re-
quirements of the augmentation lemma for β = 12 and α = 1 (as all rules are k-SNM-1 for
all k) for all k, so Lemma 5.1 results in an ∞-SNM-2/3 rule.
At this point the experienced reader may wonder about other useful properties of the
SLP Tournament Rule. In section B of the appendix we show that the SLP Tournament
Rule is not monotone.
6 Cover-Consistent Tournament Rules
In this section we shift gears and return to 2-SNM-α tournaments. We extend the results
of [16] not in the direction of larger k or smaller α, but towards a more stringent require-
ment than Condorcet-consistence (cover-consistence). The main result of this section is
Theorem 1.3, which develops a new tournament rule which is cover-consistent and 2-SNM-
1/3 (the smallest α possible, by Lemma 2.3). We call our rule Randomized-King-of the Hill
and define it below.
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ALGORITHM 1: Pseudocode for the Randomized-King-of-the-Hill Tournament
Rule.
Input: A tournament graph T = (V,E) on n teams.
Output: A winning team i ∈ V .
repeat
Choose a team j ∈ V uniformly at random ;
if (j is a Condorcet winner);
then
return j;
end
V ← V \ {j ∪ δ+T (j)};
until;
Definition 6.1 (Randomized-King-of-the-Hill) The Randomized-King-of-the-Hill Tour-
nament Rule (RKotH) starts every step by first checking whether there is a Condorcet winner
among the remaining teams. If so, that team is declared the winner. If not, it picks a uni-
formly random remaining team i (which we’ll call the prince) and removes team i and all
teams which lose to i. Algorithm 1 provides pseudocode.
The main distinction we’ll emphasize between RSEB and RKotH is that RKotH is cover-
consistent (Lemma 6.1 below), while RSEB is not (Observation 3). We later show that
RKotH is also 2-SNM-1/3, just like RSEB.
Lemma 6.1 RKotH is cover-consistent.
Proof. Consider any two teams u, v where u covers v. If RKotH is to possibly output v,
the team u must be removed at some round where team x is selected. If at the start of this
round, v has already been removed, then v will clearly not be declared the winner. If at the
start of this round, v has not already been removed, then v is removed this round because
v loses to x (as x beats u and u covers v). Therefore, v can never be declared the winner
by RKotH.
We will also use the fact that RKotH is monotone in our remaining proof. Below (and for
the remainder of this section), we’ll refer to a prince as the most recently selected remaining
team, and we’ll refer to an execution of RKotH as simply an ordering over potential princes
(to be selected if they haven’t yet been eliminated when their turn comes).
Lemma 6.2 RKotH is monotone. That is, if T, T ′ are {u, v}-adjacent and u beats v in T ,
then ru(T ) ≥ ru(T ′).
Proof. Consider any execution of RKotH and consider the first time that either u or v
is prince (observe that prior to this, the edge between u and v is never queried, so the
execution on T and T ′ is identical). If either u or v is already eliminated, then it doesn’t
matter whether u beats v or vice versa, and the outcome is the same. Otherwise, if u is the
prince and u beats v, then there is a chance that u wins. If u loses to v, then u is eliminated
immediately. If v is the prince and u beats v, then there is a chance that u wins. If u loses
to v, then u is eliminated immediately. Therefore, for every execution, if u wins in T ′, u
also wins in T , and the lemma holds.
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The rest of this section is devoted to proving that RKotH is 2-SNM-1/3. The key approach
of our proof is the following: consider any round in which both u and v still remain. The
next team selected as prince might beat both u and v (in which case the outcome between
u and v is never queried), lose to both u and v (in which case the outcome has not yet been
queried), or beat exactly one of {u, v} (in which case again the outcome between u and v is
never queried). The only event in which we ever query the outcome of the match is when
one of {u, v} is selected as prince while the other remains (and even then, the outcome only
matters if some teams remain which beat exactly one of {u, v}). So the key approach in
the proof is a coupling argument between different possible executions of RKotH (some of
which make the match between u and v irrelevant, and some of which cause {u, v} to prefer
the match turn one way or the other).
Proof of Theorem 1.3 In order to show the rule is 2-SNM-1/3, consider two teams u, v
who are trying to collude in a given tournament T . Suppose wlog that u beats v in T and
let T ′ be the {u, v}-adjacent tournament to T where v beats u.
To begin the analysis, we first introduce some notation. Let S be the subset of teams
which either beat at least one of u or v, or are u or v. For a given execution of RKotH let x
denote the first prince in S on tournament T . Observe first that there must be a prince in
S at some point (otherwise neither u nor v is ever eliminated), and also that x is the first
prince in S on tournament T ′ as well (for the same execution). Let also X denote the set of
princes strictly before x was chosen, and Y (X) denote the set of un-eliminated teams after
the set X of princes. We first observe that, conditioned on X, the next prince is a uniformly
random element of Y (X) ∩ S.
Lemma 6.3 For all X ⊂ [n]\S, conditioned on the set X being princes so far, and the next
prince being an element of S, the next prince is a uniformly random element of Y (X) ∩ S.
Proof. For all X ⊆ [n] \ S, conditioned on the set X being princes so far, the next prince
is a uniformly random element of Y (X), so each element of Y (X)∩S is selected with equal
probability.
The main step in the proof is the following lemma, which claims that after conditioning
on X, the difference between T and T ′ in terms of whether one of {u, v} wins under RKotH
is small.
Lemma 6.4 For all X, let ru,v(T,X) denote the probability that RKotH selects a winner in
{u, v}, conditioned on X being exactly the set of princes before the first prince in S. Then
for all X, |ru,v(T ′, X)− ru,v(T,X)| ≤ 1/3.
Proof. We consider a few possible cases, conditioned on the structure of Y (X) ∩ S, and
which team is the next prince. To aid in formality, we’ll use the notation ru,v(T,X|E) to
denote the probability that RKotH selects a winner in {u, v} on tournament T conditioned
on exactly the set X of princes before the first prince in S and event E.
Case One: Y (X)∩S = {u, v}. In this case, certainly u or v will win in tournament T and
T ′. This is because all remaining teams lose to both u and v, so whoever wins the match be-
tween u and v is a Condorcet winner among the remaining teams and will therefore win. So
if E1 denotes the event that Y (X)∩S = {u, v}, we have that ru,v(T,X|E1) = ru,v(T ′, X|E1).
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Case Two: |Y (X) ∩ S| > 2, next prince /∈ {u, v}. In this case, at least one of {u, v} are
eliminated immediately, and the match result is never queried. Therefore, the result is the
same under T and T ′. So if E2 denotes the event that |Y (X) ∩ S| > 2 and the next prince
is not in {u, v}, we have that ru,v(T,X|E2) = ru,v(T ′, X|E2).
Case Three: |Y (X) ∩ S| > 2, next prince is u. In this case, we claim it is always better
for {u, v} to be in T ′ (v beats u) versus T . To see this, first consider that maybe some
remaining element of Y (X)∩S beats u. Then u certainly will not win. If u beats v, then v
also will certainly not win. But if v beats u, then maybe v can win. If no remaining element
of Y (X)∩S beats u, then either u will win in T , or v will win in T ′ (because all teams aside
from u and v are eliminated). So if E3 denotes the event that |Y (X) ∩ S| > 2 and the next
prince is u, we have that ru,v(T
′, X|E3) ≥ ru,v(T,X|E3).
Case Four: |Y (X) ∩ S| > 2, next prince is v. This case is symmetric to the above,
and it is always better for {u, v} to be in T versus T ′. So if E4 denotes the event that
|Y (X) ∩ S| > 2 and the next prince is v, we have that: ru,v(T,X|E4) ≥ ru,v(T ′, X|E4).
So to conclude, we’ve seen that if |Y (X)∩S| = 2, then the outcome is the same under T
and T ′, so the lemma statement clearly holds for any X with |Y (X)∩S| = 2. If |Y (X)∩S| >
2, then there is exactly one choice for the next team which may cause {u, v} to prefer T
to T ′ (and vice versa). By Lemma 6.3, the next prince is drawn uniformly at random from
|Y (X) ∩ S|, so this element is selected with probability at most 1/3. Formally, for any X
with |Y (X) ∩ S| > 2 we have:
ru,v(T,X)− ru,v(T ′, X) = Pr[E2] · (ru,v(T,X|E2)− ru,v(T ′, X|E2))
+ Pr[E3] · (ru,v(T,X|E3)− ru,v(T ′, X|E3))
+ Pr[E4] · (ru,v(T,X|E4)− ru,v(T ′, X|E4))
≤Pr[E2] · 0 + Pr[E3] · 0 + Pr[E4] · 1 ≤ 1|Y (X) ∩ S| ≤ 1/3.
Similar inequalities hold for ru,v(T
′, X)−ru,v(T,X) but with the role of E3 and E4 swapped,
allowing us to conclude that indeed |ru,v(T,X)− ru,v(T ′, X)| ≤ 1/3.
The rest of the proof now follows easily. Below, if ru,v(T ) denotes the probability that
either u or v wins under RKotH for tournament T , and p(X) denotes the probability that
X is exactly the set of princes before the first prince in S is selected (under tournament T ),
we have:
|ru,v(T )− ru,v(T ′)| ≤
∑
X
p(X) · |ru,v(T,X)− ru,v(T ′, X)| ≤ 1/3.
While RKotH and RSEB are optimal tournament rules against collisions of size 2, their
effectiveness disappears as the collisions become larger. In particular, in Appendix B we
show a specific tournament against both rules for which large collisions can increase their
odds of winning up to close to 1.
20
7 Conclusion
We extend work of [16] in three different directions: First, we refute their main conjecture
(Theorem 1.1, Sections 3 and 4). Next, we design the first Condorcet-consistent tournament
rule which is ∞-SNM-(< 1) (Theorem 1.2, Sections 3 and 5). Finally, we design a new
tournament rule (RKotH) which is 2-SNM-1/3 (just like RSEB), but which is also cover-
consistent (Theorem 1.3, Section 6).
Reiterating from Section 1, the main appeal of our results is clearly theoretical, and
some of this appeal comes from the process itself. For example, Theorem 4.2 reduces the
search for a Condorcet-consistent ∞-SNM-1/2 rule to determining whether or not the SLP
Tournament Rule is∞-SNM-1/2. Additionally, the same tools developed in Section 3 proved
useful both for proving lower bounds and designing new tournament rules, suggesting that
these tools should be useful in future works as well.
One clear direction for future work, now that the main conjecture of [16] is refuted, is
to understand what the minimum α is such that an ∞-SNM-α tournament rule exists. It is
also interesting to understand how large k needs to be in order for the [16] conjecture to be
false. Our work does not rule out the existence of a 3-SNM-2/5 tournament rule, yet we also
do not know of any 3-SNM-2/5 rule (nor even a 3-SNM-1/2 rule). More generally, our work
contributes to the broad agenda of understanding the tradeoffs between incentive compat-
ibility and quality of winner selected in tournament rules, and there are many interesting
problems in this direction.
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A Missing proofs from Section 2.2
To prove Proposition 2.4, we first need some additional machinery.
Definition A.1 (Pfaffian) The Pfaffian of an n×n skew-symmetric matrix A (when n =
2k is even) is defined as follows. First, let Π be the set of all partitions of [2k] into pairs
without regard to order. If we write an element α ∈ Π as {(i1, j1), (i2, j2), · · · (ik, jk)} with
i` < j` for all ` and i1 < i2 < . . . < ik, then let piα denote the permutation with piα(2` −
1) = i` and piα(2`) = j` (i.e. piα sorts elements in the order i1, j1, i2, j2, . . .). Let Aα :=
sgn(piα)
∏k
`=1Ai`,j` .
3 Then the Pfaffian of A, denoted by Pf(A), is equal to
∑
α∈ΠAα.
Theorem. A.1 When n is even, any n × n skew-symmetric matrix A satisfies Det(A) =
(Pf(A))2.
Proof of Proposition 2.4 We will first prove the case when n is even, using Theorem A.1.
We first observe that as A is unit skew-symmetric, |Aij | = 1 for all i 6= j. Therefore, for
all α ∈ Π, |Aα| = 1. So the Pfaffian of A is the sum of |Π| terms, each of which are ±1.
Therefore, if we can show that |Π| is odd, the Pfaffian must be non-zero, Theorem A.1
implies that Det(A) 6= 0 as well (meaning that A has full rank).
It is straight forward to count the number of elements in Π: first, there are n− 1 choices
for the partner of 1. Then, there are n−3 choices for the partner of the smallest unpartnered
element. After choosing the first ` pairs, there are n− 2`− 1 choices for the partner of the
smallest unpartnered element. So there are (n− 1) · (n− 3) . . . 5 · 3 elements of Π, which is
an odd number.
Now we consider the case where n is odd. Observe first that the submatrix of A created
by removing the last row and last column is a unit skew symmetric matrix with even
dimension, and therefore has rank n − 1. Therefore, the rank of A is also at least n − 1.
By Jacobi’s theorem, all skew symmetric matrices of odd dimension have determinant zero
(and are therefore not of full rank). Therefore, the rank must be exactly n− 1.
Proof of Proposition 2.5 For a given δ > 0, let Y be the set of all vectors in the unit
hypercube with `1 distance strictly less than δ from some element of P0 (i.e. there exists
an element in P0 within `1 distance strictly less than δ). It is easy to see that Y is an open
set. Now let S = [0, 1]n \ Y . Note that S is closed and bounded, and therefore compact.
Definte now the function f(~y) = max{0,maxi∈[n]~bi − (A · ~y)i}. First observe that f(·)
is continuous, as it is a composition (via maximums, subtractions, etc.) of affine functions.
Observe also that ~y ∈ Pε for all ε ≥ f(~y), and that ~y /∈ Pε for all ε < f(~y). We now consider
two possible cases for inf~y∈S{f(~y)}, and find our desired ε.
• Case 1: inf~y∈S{f(~y)} = 0. As S is compact, f achieves its infimum over S. Therefore,
there exists a ~y ∈ S with f(~y) = 0. Let’s parse what this means. First, as f(~y) = 0, we
know that ~y ∈ P0. But also, P0 ⊆ Y , and S ∩ Y = ∅. So any ~y ∈ S cannot also be in
P0, which means f(~y) > 0 for all ~y ∈ S, meaning that we can’t have inf~y∈S{f(~y)} = 0
after all.
• Case 2: inf~y∈S{f(~y)} = c > 0. Then let ε = c/2. Now, observe that all elements of S
are not in Pε, as they all have f(~y) > ε.
3Recall that the sign of a permutation pi, denoted here by sgn(pi) is equal to the number of inversions in
pi (that is, the number of pairs i < j with pi(i) > pi(j)).
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Figure 4: The tournament on the left can be manipulated by the set of green teams to
become the tournament on the right.
So to wrap up, we must have inf~y∈S{f(~y)} = c > 0, and if we set ε = c/2, then S∩Pε = ∅.
Therefore, as S ∩ Y = [0, 1]n, it must be the case that all of Pε is contained in Y . But this
is exactly the desired statement: all elements of Pε have some point in P0 within distance
δ. So take this to be our desired ε.
B Limitations of the proposed tournament rules
In this section we analyze further properties of the two main tournament rules discussed on
this paper. First we show that the SLP tournament rule fails to satisfy monotonicity, a very
natural and desirable property from the point of view of a tournament designer.
Claim B.1 SLP is not a monotone tournament rule.
Proof. Consider the tournament T and it’s {3, 5}-adjacent tournament T ′, both depicted
in Figure 4. In T , 5 beats 3 originally and the SLP tournament rule awarded team 5 a .2
chance of winning. If instead 5 purposely throws its game to 3, the SLP tournament rule
rewards team 5 by increasing its chance of winning to 1/3. Therefore the SLP tournament
rule is not monotone.
Next we show that the optimality of RSEB,RKotH against collisions of size 2 fails to
translate to larger collisions. In particular, we show that the manipulability of both rules
tends to 1 as the size of the collision increases, ruling both of them out as candidates for
∞-SNM-α for constant α < 1. First we define a family of tournaments that will be useful
in showing lower bounds for both rules. These tournaments were introduced in [16].
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Definition B.1 (Kryptonite Tournament [16]) A kryptonite tournament T on n teams
has a superman team (wlog label it 1) who beats everyone except a kryptonite team (wlog
label it n). Moreover, team n loses to every other team except 1. The outcomes of the
matches between the remaining teams may be arbitrary.
We now proceed with the main claim of this section.
Claim B.2 RKotH is no better than k-SNM-(k − 1)/(k + 1) for any k. RSEB is no better
than k-SNM-(k − 1)/k when k + 1 is a power of 2.
Proof. Consider k and let n = k+1. Let T be any kryptonite tournament on n teams, with
team 1 as the superman team and team n as the kryptonite team. In order for team 1 to
win under RKotH, the rule must avoid selecting teams 1 and n. Under any other first choice
of prince, RKotH will declare team 1 the winner. Therefore it declares team 1 the winner
with probability (k − 1)/(k + 1). However, if all teams but the superman collude they can
make the kryptonite a Condorcet-winner. The collision’s combined odds of winning before
were exactly 2/(k + 1), so RKotH is at least k-SNM-(k − 1)/(k + 1).
Now let k + 1 be a power of two and consider the same T as before. In order for the
superman team to win under RSEB it must avoid the kryptonite team in the first round.
Therefore RSEB crowns the superman team winner with probability (k − 1)/k. However,
all other teams can form a collision and turn the kryptonite team into a Condorcet-winner,
increasing their winning mass by (k − 1)/k. Therefore, RSEB is at least k-SNM-(k − 1)/k
when k + 1 is a power of 2.
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